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Open access under CC The acquisition of volitional control depends, in part, on developing the ability to counter-
mand a planned action. Many tasks have been used to tap the efﬁciency of this process, but
few studies have investigated how it may be modulated by participants’ motivation. Multi-
ple mechanisms may be involved in the deliberate exercise of caution when incentives are
provided. For example, control may involve modulation of the efﬁciency of the counter-
manding process, and/or inhibitory modulation of the impulse to go. One of the most com-
monly used paradigms to assess control of action is the Stop Signal Task, in which a
primary Go stimulus is occasionally followed by a countermanding Stop signal, allowing
a Stop Signal Reaction Time (SSRT) to be inferred as the outcome of a ‘‘horse race” between
the go and countermanding processes. Here, we present a computational model in which
high task motivation modulates proactive pre-stimulus inhibition of the go response. This
allows responses to be calibrated so as to fall within a time-window that maximizes the
probability of success, regardless of trial type, but does not decrease the observed SSRT.
We report empirical support for the model from a sample of typically developing children,
and discuss the broader implications for operationalizing measures of volitional control.
 2009 Elsevier B.V.Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
We often warn children to ‘‘be careful!” Impulsive ac-
tion leads to accidents. And yet for many tasks, speed is
also important. To cross a busy road we need to prepare
to walk briskly, yet restrain the impulse to go until we have
checked that the road is clear. Learning to control impul-
sive action is therefore an important aspect of develop-
ment, and age-inappropriate levels of impulsivity are a
clinically relevant symptom in developmental disorders
such as Attention Deﬁcit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD,
American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Multiple models
and empirical ﬁndings have brought into debate the ques-72; fax: +44 0 115
uk (E.B. Liddle).
BY license.tion as to precisely how the control of action is imple-
mented, both at the cognitive (e.g. Baddeley & DellaSala,
1996; Shallice, 1988), and at the neural level (e.g. Duncan,
2001; Goldman-Rakic, 1996; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Pass-
ingham, 1993; Stuss & Alexander, 2007).
In an inﬂuential paper, Logan and Cowan (1984) pre-
sented a theory of the control of action in the form of a
horse race. Two independent processes were posited: an
ongoing go process and a countermanding stopping pro-
cess, each taking a variable time to complete. The ‘‘horse
race” for action control is thus between an ongoing ‘‘go
process horse” with a head start, and a faster ‘‘stop process
horse” trying to catch up. If it succeeds in catching up be-
fore a ballistic point of no return, the response is success-
fully countermanded. If not, the ‘‘go process horse” wins,
and the countermanding process fails. The relative values
of two reaction times (RTs) are thus critical to the result
of the race: the overt RT to the stimulus to act, and the
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ferred to as the Stop Signal Reaction Time (SSRT).
Many subsequent studies have assessed limits and
boundary conditions of the original model as an account
of controlled action (e.g. Band, Ridderinkhof, & van der Mo-
len, 2003; Boucher, Palmeri, Logan, & Schall, 2007; van den
Wildenberg, van der Molen, & Logan, 2002). Further stud-
ies also demonstrated both overlap and differences across
paradigms designed to investigate aspects of cognitive
control, such as dual tasks and tasks requiring response
countermanding, as well as tasks requiring control of com-
peting responses (e.g. Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman,
1990; Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, Logan, & Strayer, 1994;
Logan & Burkell, 1986; Ridderinkhof, Band, & Logan,
1999). Converging cognitive and neural evidence suggests
that control tasks requiring participants to inhibit certain
responses or to countermand an initiated response rely
on similar control mechanisms and underlying neural cir-
cuits. (For a recent review, see Aron et al., 2007.)
1.1. Inhibitory control of action
An experimental paradigm originally stimulating the
development of the horse-race model and now routinely
used for investigating the control of action is the Stop Sig-
nal Task (Lappin & Eriksen, 1966; Logan, 1983; Logan &
Cowan, 1984), in which an imperative Go stimulus is pre-
sented, and on a minority of trials, a countermanding Stop
signal is presented after a variable Stop Signal Delay (SSD).
From the SSD value below which a response can be suc-
cessfully inhibited, the time that elapses between the pre-
sentation of the Stop Signal and a successful inhibition of
the response – the covert SSRT – can be inferred. The SSRT
can be computed by various methods (Band, van der Mo-
len, & Logan, 2003; Colonius, 1990; De Jong, Coles, Logan,
& Gratton, 1990; Logan, 1981; Logan & Cowan, 1984) on
the assumption that successful Stop trials are those in
which, had those trials been Go trials, the reaction times
(RTs) would have come from the slower tail of the popula-
tion of RTs, whereas the RTs recorded on unsuccessful Stop
trials are drawn from the faster tail of the distribution. This
assumption is supported by the observation that the mean
RTs recorded on failed Stop trials are almost invariably fas-
ter than the mean RTs recorded on Go trials (Band, Ridder-
inkhof, et al., 2003; Logan & Cowan, 1984). The SSRT can
therefore be computed by taking the Go RT at the percen-
tile corresponding to the proportion of unsuccessfully
inhibited Stop trials and subtracting the mean SSD.
Although the horse-race model of control of action as-
sumes independence of the go and stop processes, it is
clear that if inhibition of the go process is to be achieved,
the countermanding stopping process must interact with
the ongoing go process at some point. Boucher et al.
(2007) proposed a modiﬁcation to the independent
horse-race model based on processes known to operate
during the generation and inhibition of saccades. Their
purpose was to reconcile behavioural data consistent with
an independent horse-race with known processes by
which ﬁxation and movement-related neurons interact to
trigger or countermand a saccade. In their interactive
horse-race model, the encoding of the countermanding sig-nal is followed by rising activation in neurons governing
the stopping process, which in turn inhibits the rising acti-
vation in neurons governing the go process. If the rise in go
process activation is arrested before an irretrievable ballis-
tic process is triggered, the saccade is successfully counter-
manded. The model was tested using parameters obtained
from single cell recordings from monkeys engaged in the
task. The authors concluded that the time that elapses be-
tween the point at which activation in the stopping process
neurons starts to rise and the point at which the rising acti-
vation in the go process neurons is arrested is extremely
short, and is dwarfed by the preceding period in which
the Stop stimulus is encoded.
The duration of the SSRT – the time between the Stop
stimulus onset and the inferred cancellation time of the
go process – thus consists of three elements: a substantial
period during which the Stop stimulus is encoded and
which proceeds independently of go-related processes; a
very short period during which rising activation in stop
process neurons interacts with the Go-related process;
and the duration of the independent ballistic process that
would have occurred had the participant failed to stop.
However, if, as Boucher et al. (2007) suggest, the SSRT is
composed largely of stimulus encoding and ballistic pro-
cesses, even this modiﬁed interactive horse-race model of
response inhibition is limited as a model of control per
se, as the only free parameter remains the duration of
the stimulus encoding process, which may or may not be
under volitional control. Indeed, Logan and Cowan (1984)
originally suggested that more sophisticated control mech-
anisms are likely to be relevant to the skilled control of ac-
tion. For example, in many tasks, inhibitory and activation
processes must be ﬁnely balanced to achieve a trade-off
between speed and accuracy that is appropriate to current
goals.
1.2. Motivation and control of action
Novel insights on cognitive control derive from the inte-
gration of the literature on response inhibition with that
on motivation, reward processing and decision making.
Learning models based on reward evaluation predict that
motivational incentives should affect the efﬁciency of inhi-
bition across a variety of cognitive control tasks, to the ex-
tent that these processes are under volitional control.
Indeed, empirical ﬁndings and computational models sug-
gest that cognitive control is strongly inﬂuenced by
changes in perceived value, and that such value computa-
tions are extremely complex and multi-factorial (Monta-
gue, King-Casas, & Cohen, 2006; Schultz, Dayan, &
Montague, 1997). If so, earlier accounts of the skilled con-
trol of action need to be modiﬁed to reﬂect the role of the
valuation of likely outcomes in modulating the balance be-
tween inhibition and activation.
Evidence for such balance and its effects on multiple
control parameters comes from both behavioural and elec-
trophysiological ﬁndings. In Lappin and Eriksen’s (1966)
original experiment, participants were asked to try to
maintain their proportion of correctly inhibited responses
at around 75%, while responding as rapidly as possible to
the Go stimulus. Stop Signal Delay varied from block to
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of inhibition at 75% in each block, participants had to
lengthen their mean RTs by a value close to the SSD for that
block, and observed that their results raised questions as to
the processes governing voluntary control of RT. This ques-
tion was later addressed by Ollman (1973), who postulated
that participants may establish ‘‘deadlines”, postponing
their responses so as to fall near the deadline, thus maxi-
mizing their chances of inhibiting their response should a
countermanding signal be presented.
Evidence for voluntary shifting of the balance between
speed (minimizing errors of omission) and caution (mini-
mizing errors of commission) is also provided by a study
by van den Wildenberg et al. (2002). They investigated
the effect of reduced response readiness on RT during a
Stop Signal Task with a two-forced-choice primary task,
by inserting blocks of trials in which participants, in addi-
tion to inhibiting their responses following a Stop signal,
had also to be wary of No Go trials. The authors observed
longer mean Go RTs during these blocks, accompanied by
a reduced probability of responding on Stop trials, suggest-
ing a strategic shift of their participants’ priority from
speed to caution.
Band, Ridderinkhof, et al. (2003) investigated speed-
accuracy trade-off using a cued, two-forced-choice
Go/No-Go task to compare behavioural performance and
Event Related Potentials (ERPs) in two groups of partici-
pants, each of which undertook the task under one of
two instructional conditions. In a speed condition, partici-
pants were instructed to respond as fast as possible, while
in a balance condition, accuracy as well as speed was
emphasized. The cue preceded the imperative stimulus by
1500 ms, allowing for response preparation to begin, and
indicatedwhether a left handora righthandresponse should
be prepared. In 20% of trials, the colour of the imperative
stimulus indicated that the response should be withheld.
The authors found smaller amplitudes for the Contin-
gent Negative Variation and Lateralized Readiness Poten-
tial (both preparatory ERPs) in the interval between cue
and imperative stimulus, and slower Go RTs in the balance
condition than in the speed condition. This ﬁnding sug-
gests that when participants were more strongly moti-
vated to be cautious, some kind of proactive inhibitory
restraining process was engaged well before the presenta-
tion of the imperative stimulus, slowing Go reaction times,
and increasing the probability of a successfully inhibited
response in the event of a No-go trial. Alternatively, where
speed was the primary motivator, Go processes may have
been potentiated. Thus, while the encoding of the go and
stop stimuli may be largely independent (in accord with
the horse-race model), optimal performance on the task
may require ﬁne calibration of the balance between activa-
tion and inhibition of the response preparation process
according to the motivational values assigned to speed
and accuracy respectively.
Action control tasks frequently employ protocols de-
signed to discourage strategic slowing, for example, by
imposing time limits, and/or by rendering the inhibition
rate independent of strategic slowing by the use of tracking
algorithms that maintain an inhibition rate of 50% (Band,
van der Molen, et al., 2003; Logan, Schachar, & Tannock,1997; Osman, Kornblum, & Meyer, 1986; Sylwan, 2004).
However, as the study by Band, Ridderinkhof, et al., 2003
would seem to indicate, and as Lappin and Eriksen
(1966), and later Ollman (1973), noted, strategic slowing
may itself index an important aspect of inhibitory control
of action, reﬂecting the effects of changing instructional
contingencies on intrinsic motivation.
The existing literature on the role of extrinsic motiva-
tion in modulating performance on the Stop Signal Task
is limited to a few studies (Huang-Pollock, Mikami, Pﬁff-
ner, & McBurnett, 2007; Konrad, Gauggel, Manz, & Scholl,
2000; Michel, Kerns, & Mateer, 2005; Oosterlaan & Ser-
geant, 1998; Scheres, Oosterlaan, & Sergeant, 2001; Slusar-
ek, Velling, Bunk, & Eggers, 2001), and is ambiguous, but
generally suggests that motivational incentives affect
inhibitory control, for example, by bringing performance
by children with ADHD up to the level of typically develop-
ing children (Slusarek et al., 2001).
There is a body of evidence, therefore, to suggest that
motivational factors, both intrinsic and extrinsic, modulate
the efﬁciency of inhibitory control of action. How might
these inﬂuences on action control be implemented? Is a
single inhibitory process sufﬁcient to account for them?
1.3. Mechanisms of inhibitory control
Schachar et al. (2007) proposed that in addition to can-
cellation processes following a countermanding signal, re-
straint processes implicated in behaviour observed during
action control may be worthy of separate study, and that
differing, if overlapping, circuits might be implicated in
each. In order to study these distinct aspects of inhibitory
control, the authors asked whether either or both of these
processes function atypically in clinically impulsive
children.
The ﬁnding of longer SSRTs in children with ADHD is ro-
bust (Jennings, van der Molen, Pelham, Debski, & Hoza,
1997; Logan et al., 1997; Nigg, 1999; Schachar, Tannock,
& Logan, 1993), and has been interpreted as evidence for
deﬁcits in inhibitory control. Schachar et al. (2007) sought
to tease apart the effects of restraint and cancellation on
the observed SSRTs, and to ascertain whether children with
ADHD would show deﬁcits in both. The authors used two
versions of the Stop Signal Task, in both of which the pri-
mary task was a visual two-forced-choice reaction task,
and the Stop signal was an auditory tone. In a cancellation
version, the Stop signal was presented after a variable SSD,
computed using a tracking algorithm, while in a restraint
version, the Stop Signal Delay was zero, rendering it com-
parable to a Go/No-Go task. The authors reasoned that in
the cancellation version, the Stop signal would interrupt
an already ongoing response process, whereas in the re-
straint version, children would delay the initiation of their
response to the primary task stimulus until they had deter-
mined whether or not it was a Stop trial. The authors
therefore proposed that the SSRTs in each version would
index the efﬁciency of cancellation and restraint processes
respectively.
The authors found that in both typically developing
children and those with ADHD, SSRTs were longer in the
restraint version than in the cancellation version, which
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that two separate processes might be involved, and con-
cluded that children with ADHD had deﬁcits in both. How-
ever, it is not self-evident that SSRT in the two versions
accurately indexes both of these processes. In horse-race
terminology, strategic restraint should delay the ‘‘go horse”
rather than increase the speed of the ‘‘stop horse”, the can-
cellation process. If the participant strategically delays his/
her responses, the percentage of failed responses on Stop
trials will tend to decrease, thereby lowering the rank of
the Go RT used to compute the SSRT, and leaving SSRT it-
self unchanged. Thus, the authors’ interpretation of their
ﬁndings of longer SSRT in the restraint version as evidence
for a separate restraint process may not be justiﬁed.
It remains unclear, therefore, which of multiple possible
parameters modulating performance, including SSRT, may
be under volitional control, bringing into question whether
or not the longer SSRTs observed in participants with
ADHD reﬂect impairments implicated in clinical impulsiv-
ity. One alternative interpretation is that the stimulus-
encoding process in participants with ADHD is simply
more time-consuming than in control participants, and
may be irreducible beyond a certain working memory lim-
it, as suggested in a review by Lijfﬁjt, Kenemans, Verbaten,
and van Engeland (2005), and which would not necessarily
result in the clinically impulsive behaviour that is a symp-
tom of the condition. In contrast, if the duration of the go
preparation process is modulated by proactive partial
engagement of restraint processes in anticipation of a sig-
nal to stop, as suggested by some of the evidence presented
above, then deﬁcits in volitional control of such strategic
restraint processes may prove more relevant to clinical
impulsivity than slow encoding of countermanding signals.
However, such a deﬁcit would not be indexed by the SSRT.
It is therefore pertinent to revisit the question originally
posed by Lappin and Eriksen (1966) in their original paper
regarding the processes governing voluntary control of the
impulse to respond. What might participants actually be
doing when they try to inhibit their response to a stimulus,
and, by extension, what are those who exhibit apparently
impulsive behaviour failing to do in such tasks? This paper
poses the question as to whether, in a task in which the re-
sponse to a Go stimulus may be randomly countermanded,
increased motivation to avoid errors of commission results
in shorter SSRTs, or, alternatively, whether it results in
greater proactive restraint on the go preparation processes
on all trials, and thus an increased probability of a success-
ful inhibition should the trial prove to require it. Three
alternative hypotheses as to how inhibition processes
might be modulated by motivation are presented, and pre-
dictions ﬂowing from these models are tested against data
from a sample of school age children who undertook a ver-
sion of the Stop Signal Task under three different motiva-
tional conditions.
1.4. Modelling motivated control of action
Following Logan and Cowan (1984), we assume that the
response to a Go stimulus can be divided into two por-
tions: an early portion during which the response can be
inhibited; and a later ballistic portion that follows a pointof no return, beyond which inhibitory processes cannot re-
voke the response. Also, like Logan and Cowan (1984), we
assume that if the stopping process is completed before
this point of no return is reached, a successful inhibition
will result (a signal–inhibit trial), but that if the point of
no return is reached before the completion of the stopping
process, an error of commission will be made (a signal–re-
spond trial).
The Stop Signal Task is represented graphically in Fig. 1.
At time zero, the primary task stimulus is presented (A). On
a minority of trials, after a variable SSD, a Stop signal is
presented (B). In this representation, a time limit for Go tri-
als is also imposed (C). The curved line represents a distri-
bution of durations of the revocable portion of a set of
responses, and the double headed arrow represents that
participant’s Stop Signal Reaction Time (SSRT). Any Stop
trial in which the point of no return occurs earlier than
the Stop signal (B) plus the SSRT will be a signal–respond
trial. This population of signal–respond trials will therefore
be drawn from the population of revocable response dura-
tions shown in the shaded area of the ﬁgure. Moreover, in a
paradigm in which a time limit is imposed, any Go trial in
which the point of no return is delayed so long that the
resulting response time occurs later than the time limit
(C) will result in a missed-response trial. This population
of missed-response trials will be drawn from the distribu-
tion of revocable response durations shown in the dotted
portion of the diagram. The successful Go trials (hits) will
be drawn from the remainder of the distribution. How
would motivation affect cognitive control within this
framework?
If a participant is highly motivated to maximize the
number of successful trials (trials that are either signal–in-
hibit or hits), three potential strategies are theoretically
possible.
1.4.1. Hypothesis 1
Firstly, the participant might be able to reduce the dura-
tion of his/her SSRT. This would result in the pattern of per-
formance illustrated diagrammatically in Fig. 2, in which a
shorter SSRT leads to a smaller proportion of Stop trials
that are signal–respond trials, and leaves unchanged the
proportion of Go trials that are missed. This ﬁnding would
be consistent with the focus on SSRT as a marker of action
control in all existing theories of Stop Signal Task perfor-
mance. If, as suggested by Boucher et al. (2007) the non-
ballistic portion of the SSRT is largely taken up with
encoding processes, then such a strategy would involve
increasing the efﬁciency with which the Stop stimulus is
encoded.
1.4.2. Hypothesis 2
A second strategy that a participant might adopt would
be to delay all responses by means of proactive, tonic, inhi-
bition of the go process on all trials so that the point of no
return is reached consistently later in the trial. This tonic
restraint strategy is shown diagrammatically in Fig. 3, in
which the dashed curved line represents the initial popula-
tion of response durations (revocable portion), and the so-
lid curve represents a population of durations that have
been extended by engagement of a restraint process on
Atime
B
SSRT
C
Missed Go 
Variable SSD
Failed Stop 
Fig. 1. Diagrammatic representation of Stop Signal Task. Note: The primary stimulus is presented at Time A. On a minority of trials, a ‘‘Stop” signal is
presented after a variable delay (‘‘Stop Signal Delay” – SSD). The curve represents a histogram of response times. The model assumes that if the Stop Signal
(B) is presented early enough that the SSRT will be completed during the period in which the response preparation is still within its ‘‘revocable” phase, the
response will be successfully inhibited, but that if the response process has gone beyond the ‘‘point of no return”, the Stop process will fail. If, on a Go trial,
the response falls beyond the time limit (C), the trial will be a ‘‘missed response” trial, i.e. a missed Go.
A
time
B
SSRT
C
Failed Stop Trials Missed Go Trials 
Fig. 2. Hypothesis 1. Note: The participant reduces the duration of the SSRT, decreasing the proportion of failed Stop trials. There is no effect on mean RT of
the Go trials, and the proportion of missed Go trials is unchanged.
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unaffected, but increase the proportion of missed-response
trials, provided that a time limit is imposed. The adoption
of this strategy would be consistent with the ﬁndings of
Band, Ridderinkhof, et al. (2003) of a global increase in
RT when participants were asked to balance speed against
accuracy.
1.4.3. Hypothesis 3
A third strategy would be for the participants to time
their responses more accurately so as to increase the pro-
portion of their responses falling within the time window
at which the probability of success is maximized. This
strategy is shown diagrammatically in Fig. 4. The dashed
curve again represents the initial population of response
durations (revocable portion), and the solid curve a popu-
lation of response durations in which a higher proportionfall within the time window that maximizes the chances
of success – slow enough to give a fair chance of successful
inhibition should a Stop signal be presented, but fast en-
ough to be completed within the time limit should the trial
turn out to be a Go. As with hypothesis 2, proactive re-
straint is postulated to be applied to go processes on all tri-
als, but, unlike hypothesis 2, the restraint process is
postulated to be one that is precisely calibrated trial by
trial in order to target the optimal time window, rather
than simply a tonic inhibitory set that globally increases
the duration of the go processes on every trial. If this strat-
egy were to be adopted, an increase in inhibition rate
would be achieved without the cost of an increased miss
rate, differentiating it from Hypothesis 2.
In summary, Hypothesis 1 predicts that motivation will
affect SSRT by increasing the speed at which a signal to
stop is encoded. In contrast, both Hypotheses 2 and 3
Atime
B
SSRT
C
Missed GoFailed Stop
Fig. 3. Hypothesis 2. Note: The participant globally delays all responses, increasing both mean and variance of RT distribution. The proportion of failed Stop
trials decreases, but the proportion of missed Go trials increases. This strategy would result in a smaller population of Stop trials in which the response was
unsuccessfully inhibited, but a larger population of Go trials in which the response was too late. It models the pattern of responses seen in Band et al.’s
(2003) balance condition, in which participants’ responses were globally slower than that of those in the speed condition.
A B C
SSRT
time
Failed Stop Trials Missed Go Trials
Fig. 4. Hypothesis 3. Note: Participants target their responses on the time window in which success is most probable. Failed Stop Trials are reduced at no
cost in missed Go trials.
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cess itself, exercising voluntary control over the duration of
the go process. However, whereas Hypothesis 2 postulates
a global strategic slowing of all responses, at the cost of in-
creased missed Go trials, Hypothesis 3 proposes that this
control is precisely calibrated, trial by trial, in such a way
as to maximize the probability of success if a counter-
manding signal is presented, while simultaneously mini-
mizing the probability of missing a go stimulus.
The prediction made by Hypothesis 1 can be operation-
alized simply as a decrease in SSRT when the incentive to
inhibit is increased. The prediction made by Hypothesis 2
can be operationalised as an increase in mean GoRT in re-
sponse to greater incentive to inhibit. However, in order to
operationalise the predictions made by Hypothesis 3, it
was necessary to investigate what observable parameters
might be modiﬁed by an optimization of the RT distribu-
tion in response to increased incentive to inhibit. In order
to do this, ﬁrstly, a simple Bayesian statistical model wasdeveloped to capture the optimization parameters. We
then used simulations to test how these might be modiﬁed
by motivational incentives, and achieved by modulation of
control parameters. Finally we operationalized the differ-
ential predictions of Hypotheses 1–3 using the ﬁndings
from our model simulations.
Our Bayesian model is shown in Fig. 5. The dot-dashed
line represents the probability of success on Stop trials for
any given revocable response duration for Stop trials. The
longer the duration of the revocable portion, the more
likely it will be that the Stop Signal will have occurred be-
fore the ‘‘point of no return” is reached, allowing the re-
sponse to be successfully inhibited. The upward slope of
the line is therefore a function of the distribution of SSDs
speciﬁed by the experimenter. The solid line in the ﬁgure
is the summed probability of overall success, given the
probability of Go and Stop trials respectively. For any given
revocable response duration, the probability of success for
any trial is given by:
0 
.25 
.50
.75
1.00 
Revocable response 
Pr
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y 
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 s
uc
ce
ss
 
Go 
Stop 
Net probability 
of success 
Fig. 5. Bayesian model. Note: Time is represented along the horizontal axis, and each point along that axis represents the duration of the revocable portion
of the RT. The vertical axis represents the probability of success. The dashed line represents the probability of success on Go trials for any given revocable
portion of the response. A response with a short revocable portion will result in a response time with a high probability of being within the time limit. As the
duration of the revocable portion is lengthened, the probability that the total response will be completed within the time limit rapidly reduces to zero. The
slope of the line is a function of the variance in the ballistic portion: the smaller the variance in the ballistic portion, the steeper the slope down to zero will
be. As the length of the revocable portion of the Go process increases (X axis), the probability of success on Go trials (timely response) decreases (dashed
line) and the probability of success (inhibited response) on Stop trials increases (dot-dashed line). The solid line represents the net probability of success on
each trial, given a 25% probability of a Stop signal on each trial.
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where p(success) is the probability of success, p(Go) is the
probability of a Go trial and p(Stop) is the probability of a
Stop trial.
It can be observed from Fig. 5 that the revocable re-
sponse duration with the maximum probability of overall
success (solid line maximum) occurs near the intersection
between the probability of success, given a Go trial, and the
probability of success, given a Stop trial. However, because
of the preponderance of Go trials (the ﬁgure illustrates a
75% probability of Go trials), the rise that precedes the
optimum duration is less steep than the drop-off in proba-
bility of success after the optimum point is reached, result-
ing in an asymmetric function with a higher shoulder on
the faster (left) side of the peak than on the slower side.
This curve thus represents a ﬁtness function: responses
that are timed so that their revocable portions terminate
under the higher portions of the curve are ‘‘ﬁtter” – more
likely to be successful – than responses in which those por-
tions terminate under lower portions of the curve. Thus,
the peak of the curve represents a ‘‘sweet spot” in which
the overall probability of success is maximized, regardless
of trial type. Note that, because of the asymmetry of the
curve, a strategy to calibrate the degree of restraint in such
a way that optimizes the simple probability of success
would result in a distribution of RTs with a peak at the
‘‘sweet spot”, but with a greater prevalence of fast re-
sponses to the left of the peak than of slow responses to
the right.
Such a distribution was modelled for the purposes of
producing Fig. 1 simply by raising the values for the prob-
ability of success given by Eq. (1) to a power. Raising the
values to a power less than 1 ﬂattens the distribution, rep-
resenting behaviour with reduced accuracy, while a power
greater than 1 increases the frequency of responses at theoptimum, and thus represents more accurate performance.
However, in practice, such behaviour must be learned by
probing the ﬁtness landscape with actual or hypothetical
responses, and receiving reinforcement signals (Montague
et al., 2006). For example, a learning algorithm in which
the responses associated with success were more likely
to be repeated, while those associated with failure were
suppressed, would enable the ‘‘ﬁtness landscape” to be ex-
plored by trial and error, and the higher areas to become
more ‘‘populated” with response times than the lower
areas. Furthermore, any change in the relative value of
the reinforcement given to Stop and Go trials will alter
the ﬁtness landscape itself, and thus the learned distribu-
tion of RTs. For example, if successful performance on Stop
trials is valued more highly than that on Go trials, the peak
corresponding to maximal ‘‘ﬁtness” will tend to move
rightwards, as longer responses net a greater yield. One
consequence of such a change in the shape of the distribu-
tion will be that the portion of the distribution correspond-
ing to signal–respond trials will be in a lengthening
negative tail. In other words, the model makes the unique
prediction that when motivational incentives to succeed
on both trial types are ﬁnely balanced, the shape of the
RT distribution will change to be more negatively skewed
than when motivation to avoid an error of commission is
reduced. One consequence of this change in RT distribution
will be that the difference between mean RTs on Go trials
and those on signal–respond trials will tend to increase
as the bulk of RTs moves rightwards. This suggests that
the difference between Go RTs and Stop (signal–respond)
RTs may be a useful index of such a change in the
distribution.
1.5. Reinforcement learning model
Reinforcement-learning models are based on the
assumption that organisms learn to achieve goals by
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action (Montague et al., 2006). Learning will occur if an ac-
tion that brings the organism closer to its goal is more
likely to be selected on future occasions (or, conversely, if
an action that counters the achievement of that goal is less
likely to be selected). Thus, the reinforcement signal can be
seen as modulating the value of the successful action, and
this value can be considered as a re-weighting of that ac-
tion with regard to future decision-making: actions with
increased value have an increased probability of being se-
lected on future occasions, and vice versa.
We therefore programmed an exploratory learning
model in Matlab 7.3 (The MathWorks, 2006). The paradigm
emulated was a Stop Signal Task with a tracking algorithm
similar to that used by Logan et al. (1997), in which the SSD
was incremented after a successful inhibition, and decre-
mented after a failed inhibition, with a constant time limit
(T) for each trial. Response times to the primary stimulus
were modelled as the sum of three components: a ﬁxed
encoding time (E) (an arbitrary constant); an adjustable
delay (D); and a ballistic component (B) with a duration
randomly drawn from a quasi-Gaussian distribution (a
Weibull distribution with a shape parameter of 3.6). The
sum of the constant E plus the variable D was taken to rep-
resent the revocable portion of the go process, with the D
component representing the lengthening effect on the go
process of a restraining inhibitory process that was subject
to trial-by-error learning. The underlying SSRT, represent-
ing the duration of the stop process, was assumed to con-
sist of an irreducible encoding duration. followed by an
instantaneous cancellation of the go process, and initially
modelled as an arbitrary constant (S) (selected to be short-
er than the go signal encoding constant E, in line with
experimental data indicating that SSRT tends to be shorter
than RT); in later implementations of the model the SSRT
was modelled as a distribution. (Note that subsequently
the observed mean SSRT over a sequence of trials was com-
puted as the RT at the percentile corresponding to failed
inhibition rate, minus the mean SSD for that sequence of
trials, and did not necessarily correspond precisely to the
modelled underlying SSRT.)
A random 25% of ‘‘trials” were deemed to be Stop trials,
and the rest were deemed to be Go trials. On Stop trials, a
Stop signal was deemed to have been presented after the
selected SSD. If the revocable portion of the go process
(E + D) on any trial was greater than the stop signal delay
plus the duration of the stopping process (SSD + S) for that
trial, a signal–inhibit was deemed to have occurred, as the
cancellation process was deemed to have been completed
before the point of no return (E + D), and the SSD was
incremented for the next Stop trial. Conversely, if the rev-
ocable portion of the go process (E + D) was less than the
signal delay plus the duration of the stopping process
(SSD + S) for that trial, a signal–respond trial was deemed
to have occurred, and the SSD was decremented for the
next Stop trial. Similarly, on any Go trial, if the total go pro-
cess duration, including the ballistic portion (E + D + B) was
less than the time limit (T), the trial was deemed to have
been a hit, while if the total go process duration was great-
er than T, the trial was deemed to have been a missed-re-
sponse trial.On each trial, the duration D was randomly retrieved
from a distribution of D durations, represented as a vector
of values and multiplied by a random ‘‘mutation” parame-
ter. The initial D distribution was generated by a Weibull
function with a shape parameter of 2, which gives a distri-
bution with a positive skew, typical of a distribution of
reaction times in a simple reaction time paradigm. Thereaf-
ter, following a successful trial, Vtrial type copies of the D
duration selected for that trial were appended to end of
the vector representing the D distribution, and the ﬁrst Vtrial
type values were deleted, where Vtrial type was an adjustable
non-negative integer representing the ‘‘value” accorded to
success on that trial type. Thus, the D distribution from
which each trial D duration was drawn became gradually
enriched by recently successful values of D and the proba-
bility of a recently successful D duration being selected on
future trials increased. The ‘‘mutation” parameter was
drawn from a Weibull distribution with mode of 1 and a
shape parameter of 2, and raised to a fractional power.
The learning algorithm is thus based on a similar princi-
ple to that of Logan’s (1992) ‘‘instance theory” of learning,
and is, essentially, an evolutionary algorithm by which
the ﬁtness landscape is explored. Moreover, the ‘‘mutation”
parameter ensured that the model was able to respond to
changes in the ﬁtness landscape (e.g. changes in the valua-
tion of each trial type) just as a minimum mutation rate is
required to prevent populations of organisms becoming
stranded on local maxima. The shape of the distribution
of the ‘‘mutation” parameter was chosen to match the
shape of the initial RT distribution, raised to a fractional
power to reduce its variance. These properties meant that
the ‘‘learned” distribution is repeatedly convolved with a
distribution with the same shape as the initial distribution,
so that in the absence of any ‘‘incentive” to ‘‘remember”
successful D values (when the value of Vtrial type is low or
zero, and few or no successful values are replicated in the
D distribution), the distribution of D tends to revert to the
initial distribution, thus emulating the extinction of the
learned behaviour in the absence of reinforcement.
In order to assess the impact of incentive to succeed on
the distribution of RTs, we manipulated the balance be-
tween the ‘‘value” of Stop trials and the ‘‘value” of Go trials.
Because in a standard Stop Signal task the Stop trials are
outnumbered by the Go trials, in order to model a condi-
tion in which the net value of the two trial types were ﬁ-
nely balanced, we accorded a higher ‘‘value” to D
durations resulting in a successful Stop trial than to delay
values resulting in a successful Go trial. We contrasted
the behaviour of the model under this ‘‘high motivation”
condition with a ‘‘low motivation” condition in which only
delays resulting in a successful Go trial had a non-zero
‘‘value”, and there was no counter-incentive to ‘‘avoid” an
erroneous response on a stop trial.
The model was tested by running it under these two
alternating motivational conditions for a range of values
of the free parameters. Runs consisted of 50 consecutive
‘‘sessions”, each session consisting of 50 ‘‘blocks”, each
with 200 ‘‘trials”. In the initial two ‘‘sessions”, each ‘‘value”
of both trial types was set to zero, enabling RT distributions
to be collected before ‘‘learning” had begun; thereafter,
‘‘high motivation” sessions were alternated with ‘‘low
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parameter, and the ﬁnal RT distribution from each block
was carried forward to the next session. ‘‘Observed” SSRTs
were computed for each block as the Go RT at the percen-
tile corresponding to the failed inhibition rate (Lappin &
Eriksen, 1966) minus the mean SSD for that block. Miss
rate, mean Go RTs, mean failed Stop RTs, and Go-Stop RT
differences (Mean Go RT minus mean failed Stop RT) were
also computed for each block.
We report here results from a run in which, following
the ﬁrst two sessions in which no value was accorded to
successes on either trial type, the even-numbered ‘‘ses-
sions” were ‘‘high motivation” sessions in which the value
accorded to successful Stop trials was set to 10, and the va-
lue of Vtrial type accorded to successful Go trials set to 2. The
odd-numbered ‘‘sessions” were ‘‘low motivation” sessions,
in which the value of Vtrial type for Stop trials was set to 0
and the value of Vtrial type for Go trials to 1. The setting of
a minimal non-zero value for successful Go trials in the
‘‘low motivation” condition proved necessary to ensure
that the mean RT did not rise unconstrainedly, and that
the miss-rate was maintained at below 50%, as observed
in actual participants. The mean value of the initial distri-
bution of RTs was set at 400 units, consisting of 350 units
of ‘‘encoding time” (E), a mean of 40 units of ‘‘delay” time
(D) and a mean of 10 units of ‘‘ballistic” time (B). In all runs
of the model using these parameters, inhibition rate con-
verged rapidly to 50% (owing to the tracking algorithm)
during the ﬁrst ‘‘session” and miss rate stabilized at 33%,
by the end of the 6th ‘‘session”.
Sample Go RT distributions from the model are plotted
in Fig. 6A. The dotted line represents the distribution be-
fore any ‘‘learning” has occurred, resembling a typical RT
distribution with a positive skew. The heavy solid line rep-
resents the distribution during the ﬁnal ‘‘high motivation”
session, when the model has ‘‘learned” an optimum RT dis-
tribution. The mode has shifted to a longer value, repre-
senting the ‘‘sweet spot” – the peak of the ﬁtness
landscape at which success is most probable – and the dis-
tribution is now negatively skewed. The lighter solid line
represents the RT distribution from the ﬁnal ‘‘low motiva-
tion” session; without any ‘‘incentive” to inhibit response
on Stop trials to counterbalance the incentive to avoid a
missed ‘‘Go” trial (i.e. without maintenance of a high prob-
ability of repeating a D duration that resulted in a success-
ful Stop trial), the Go RT distribution has reverted to one
resembling the initial distribution.
The reason for the characteristic shape of the Go RT dis-
tribution from the ‘‘high motivation” becomes apparent
from examination of Fig. 6B. The ‘‘learned” distribution of
successful delays when both trial types are valued can be
thought of as the sum of two distributions: the distribution
of delays that resulted in a correctly inhibited response on
a Stop trial, and which will tend to have longer values of D;
and the distribution of delays that resulted in a timely re-
sponse to a Go trial, and which will tend to have shorter
values. In Fig. 6B, these D distributions are plotted, both
as stored after a successful trial and as retrieved for a sub-
sequent trial. Extreme values have been systematically
eliminated from both distributions, and the modes of the
two distributions have approached each other, producinga peak in the combined distribution representing optimal
values. The ‘‘population” of restraint values has thus ‘‘colo-
nized” higher regions of the ﬁtness function given by Eq.
(1), changing the distribution from one with a longer posi-
tive tail to one with a longer negative tail, and conse-
quently increasing the difference between the mean RT
on failed Stop Trials and the mean RT on Go trials.
The mean and standard errors for the Go-Stop RT differ-
ences, the SSRTs, the SSDs, the skewness parameters, and
the Go and failed Stop RTs for each block within each ses-
sion were computed for the same run, and are presented
graphically in Fig. 7. Effect sizes (Cohen’s d) were com-
puted, using an independent samples t test on the block
means for those sessions after the model had stabilised
(sessions 5–50). As predicted, the Go-Stop RT differences
are consistently greater in the ‘‘high motivation” sessions
than in ‘‘low motivation” sessions, reﬂecting the more neg-
ative skew of the Go RT distributions, the effect being
apparent by the end of the ﬁrst block of 200 trials, and
remaining stable for the rest of the session. On this run
the effect of motivational condition on the Go-Stop RT dif-
ference was 1.6. The skewness statistic has a large associ-
ated standard error; nonetheless the statistic tended to
be more negative in the ‘‘high motivation” than in the
‘‘low motivation” sessions on all runs, although the effect
size was smaller than for the Go-Stop RT difference (Co-
hen’s d = .35). The correlation between Go-Stop RT differ-
ence and the skewness statistic was also computed for
these sessions, and for this run was signiﬁcantly negative
(r = .17, p < .001, N = 2300), indicating that Go-Stop RT
may be a good proxy measure for skewness in this task
with a larger effect size for a given degree of variance. As
expected, the SSD was consistently lower in the ‘‘high
motivation” sessions (Cohen’s d = .6), reﬂecting a ‘‘poorer”
inhibitory performance by the model when the value ac-
corded to successful Stop trials was lowered.
In Fig. 7E, both Go and failed Stop RTs are plotted for
each session. As would be expected, when the model
‘‘tries” to increase inhibition rate (although thwarted by
the algorithm, which raises the SSD in response, as shown
in Fig. 7D), the mean Go RTs tend to be longer than in the
‘‘low motivation” condition. However, to maintain a high
hit rate, the peak of the distribution has to be kept under
the time limit, pushing the whole distribution, including
the portion consisting of short RTs, leftwards (faster). For
this reason, the mean of the left hand portion of the distri-
bution from which failed Stop RTs are drawn is often faster
than in the ‘‘low motivation” condition.
Interestingly, although the SSRT was modelled as a con-
stant, the observed SSRT was consistently longer than the
modelled value (mean = 81, SD = 19 units, compared with
a modelled value of 55 units) and consistently longer still
in the ‘‘high motivation” blocks (mean = 93, SD = 19 units),
suggesting that when RT distributions are more negatively
(or less positively) skewed, the inferred SSRT is over-esti-
mated. Cohen’s d for the effect of condition on the ob-
served SSRT was .6. Moreover, the correlation coefﬁcient
between skewness and SSRT was signiﬁcantly positive
(r = .362, p < .001, N = 2300). It is worth noting, however,
that the bias in the estimate of the SSRT induced by a
change in the skewness of the Go RT distribution was in
Fig. 6. Sample output from the inhibition learning model. Note: (A) represents probability density functions for the distributions of Go RTs at the start of the
run (dotted line; left-hand vertical axis); during a later ‘‘high motivation” session (heavy solid line); and a later ‘‘low motivation” session (light solid line).
The initial distribution is positively skewed, by design. The distribution during the ‘‘high motivation” condition has a sharper peak, the mode has shifted to a
longer value, and it is negatively skewed. The distribution during the ‘‘low motivation” condition closely resembles the initial distribution, the distribution
that was learned during the ‘‘high motivation” condition having been extinguished through lack of reinforcement of success on the Stop trials. (B)
represents the probability density functions for the delay values (‘‘D”), as both stored (solid lines) and retrieved (dotted lines). The grey solid and light
dotted lines represents values of ‘‘D” resulting in successfully inhibited responses on Stop trials, and the black solid and heavy dotted lines represent values
resulting in timely Go responses. The dotted lines represent values retrieved by the model, i.e. after multiplication by the ‘‘mutation” parameter. The
‘‘learned” distribution of RTs in (A) (heavy solid line) can be thought of as the sum of these two retrieved distributions, with the addition of variance
contributed by the ballistic portion of the Go response, and the ‘‘encoding” constant, E.
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actual participants if they were able to reduce their RT in
response to an increased incentive to inhibit their re-
sponses on Stop trials: When delays resulting in a success-
ful Stop trial were more highly valued, although the
underlying SSRT remained, by design, constant, the ob-
served SSRT nonetheless increased.
Similar results to those presented here were obtained
when the highmotivation condition was presented on even
numbered blocks, and also when the underlying SSRT was
modelled with non-zero variance (values drawn randomlyfrom a Weibull distribution with a shape parameter of 3.6,
which gives an approximation to the normal distribution),
although the effect of condition on SSRTwas reduced in size.
1.6. Empirical validation
As modulation of control by motivational incentives has
generally only been explored in the context of a compari-
son between children with and without impulsivity
(Huang-Pollock et al., 2007; Konrad et al., 2000; Michel
et al., 2005; Oosterlaan & Sergeant, 1998; Scheres et al.,
Fig. 7. Typical model output. Note: Model output for a series of 50 ‘‘sessions”, each consisting of 50 ‘‘blocks” of 200 ‘‘trials”. In the ﬁrst two sessions, the
‘‘value” accorded to each trial type was set to zero. Thereafter, ‘‘low motivation” sessions (value of Go trials = 1, value of Stop trials = 0) alternated with
‘‘high motivation” sessions (value of Go trials = 2, value of Stop trials = 10). ‘‘Low” motivation blocks are shown as open symbols, ‘‘high motivation” blocks
are shown as ﬁlled symbols. Error bars represent the standard error. In plots (A–D), ‘‘high motivation” and ‘‘low motivation” sessions are shown as separate
lines, in the order presented. Go-Stop RT differences were consistently greater on ‘‘high motivation” sessions, skewness was more negative, and SSD was
lower, as predicted. Although the underlying SSRT was constant, by design, the observed SSRT was consistently longer on ‘‘high motivation” blocks,
suggesting that a more negatively skewed Go RT distribution may result in a more overestimated SSRT. In plot (E), all 50 alternating sessions are
represented in sequential order on the X axis, and both Go and failed Stop RTs are plotted for each, showing how the RT difference is consistently greater in
the high motivation sessions, even though the mean failed Stop RT is sometimes shorter and sometimes longer.
E.B. Liddle et al. / Cognition 112 (2009) 141–158 1512001; Slusarek et al., 2001), we proposed to test these
models in a sample of typically developing children in their
own right. Indeed, we believe action control processes
should be ﬁrst understood in individuals without impulsiv-
ity, in order to more clearly interpret performance differ-
ences by individuals with impulsivity. Of note, because of
its childhood onset, impulsivity in ADHD is tested in chil-
dren rather than adults, further motivating our choice of
a sample of children for our current investigation.
Following from our modelling exercise, differential pre-
dictions ﬂowing from our three hypotheses were opera-
tionalized as follows:1.6.1. Hypothesis 1
If participants were able to shorten their SSRTs in re-
sponse to greater incentive to inhibit, we should see short-
er mean SSRTs under more motivating conditions (Fig. 2).
1.6.2. Hypothesis 2
If participants tended to strategically slow their re-
sponses on all trials, we should see a higher rate of missed
‘‘Go” trials under more motivating conditions, as well as
globally longer RTs (Fig. 3). In addition, because, when RT
increases, RT variability increases (Wagenmakers & Brown,
2007), under this hypothesis one might also expect to see
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failed Stop RTs. However, if RTs were globally increased
without any change in the shape of the RT distribution,
any increase in Go RT or in the difference between Go
and failed Stop RTs should be accompanied by an increase
in the proportion of missed Go trials.
1.6.3. Hypothesis 3
If participants timed their responses more precisely in
order to maximize their chances of success on both types
of trial, we should see an increase in the difference be-
tween mean RTs on Go trials and mean RTs on signal–re-
spond trials under more motivating conditions. No effect
would be expected on miss rates if this strategy was
adopted. Thus, Hypothesis 3 would be supported if we ob-
served such a pattern of mean response times in the ab-
sence of any increase in the rate of missed responses
(Fig. 3).2. Method
2.1. Participants
Thirty-three children (23 boys and 10 girls) with a mean
age of 8 years 9 months (SD = 20 months) were recruited
from local schools. Ethics approval was obtained from the
Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology, University
of Nottingham, and written informed consent was received
from the primary care-giver of each child.
2.2. Procedure
A two forced-choice version of the Stop Signal Task was
presented on lap-top PCs with 14” monitors, and a two
button mouse (not a response box), was used for re-
sponses, easing the collection of data in school settings,
at a small cost in precision. Two lap-tops were taken to
schools and set up in a spare classroom, and two children
at a time undertook the task. The task was programmed
in E prime (Psychology Software Tools Inc.) and presented
as a computer game. The experimental task was preceded
by a short practice block of 12 Go trials, which was re-
peated until block accuracy reached 80%. Following this,
three practice blocks of the Stop signal version of the task
were presented introducing each motivational condition.
At the conclusion of the practice, a time limit was com-
puted for each child on the basis of their correct Go RTs
(time limit = mean Go RT + 3 SD) and used in the experi-
mental task.
The task was themed as a ‘‘space journey”. On the lap-
top screen was a representation of a starry sky seen
through a rectangular spaceship ‘‘porthole”. Each child
was told that the task was to steer a space-ship to a distant
planet, represented by a coloured disk 8 mm in diameter in
the centre of the computer screen. Each ‘‘planet” was pre-
sented between a pair of grey square brackets
(height = 20 mm; distance apart = 30 mm). Each child was
told that they would need to steer round ‘‘gas clouds”,
and that the grey brackets were ‘‘gas cloud detectors”
mounted in the porthole glass. If the bracket on the leftglowed red, they should press the left mouse button, and
if the bracket on the right glowed red, they should press
the right mouse button. If they pressed the wrong button,
or were too slow, a ‘‘gas cloud” would appear on screen.
The gas cloud image, if it appeared, remained on screen
for 600 ms, during which time it masked the planet. Thus
the red bracket served as the target stimulus, and re-
mained illuminated until the time limit for response had
elapsed. The gas-cloud stimulus itself provided negative
feedback for erroneous or slow responses. The children
were told to keep watching the ‘‘planet” between the two
‘‘gas cloud detectors”, which remained on screen across tri-
als. The ‘‘planet” remained visible except when the ‘‘gas
cloud” was presented, serving to help maintain ﬁxation be-
tween the ‘‘gas cloud detectors”. Gaze direction was not
systematically monitored, but two experimenters re-
mained present at all times to ensure task compliance.
The child was then warned that sometimes a ‘‘pet alien”
would ‘‘jump out” in front of the space-ship, and that if this
happened, they were to try not to press the mouse buttons.
The pet alien image thus served as the Stop signal, and took
the form of a circular black and white image of a space
alien (diameter = 25 mm), presented for 100 ms at centre
screen, temporarily masking the ﬁxation (‘‘planet”) image,
but leaving the Go stimulus (red bracket) visible. A track-
ing algorithm was used to compute the SSD for each trial:
The initial SSD was set at 200 ms; after each successfully
inhibited Stop trial, the SSD was incremented by 33 ms,
and after each unsuccessfully inhibited Stop trial the SSD
was decremented by 33 ms. The time interval between
the offset of each Go stimulus and the onset of the next
was randomly varied between 1200 and 2000 ms.
Three motivational conditions (positive, negative, and
neutral) were indicated by three differently coloured ‘‘plan-
ets” and by a rectangular picture (500 x 400 mm) of an
‘‘inhabitant” of that planet displayed in the upper right
hand corner of the screen. Children were told that on each
of ﬁve ‘‘delivery trips” they would deliver various items to
each of the three planets. Each ‘‘planet” was thus ‘‘visited”
a total of ﬁve times. On one planet (positive), the inhabit-
ants would pay 1 point each time the child missed a gas
cloud (by responding correctly under the time limit), and
5 points each time they avoided hitting the pet alien. On
another planet (negative), the inhabitants would deduct
1 point every time they hit a gas cloud (by being too slow,
or responding incorrectly) and deduct 5 points every time
they hit the pet alien. On a third planet (neutral) the inhab-
itants would neither pay nor deduct points. Within each of
the ﬁve blocks (‘‘delivery trips”), the order of the three con-
ditions (‘‘planets”) was randomized. Children were given
50 points to start with, and at the end of each visit to a pla-
net, they were given a breakdown of their point score for
that ‘‘visit”, as well as their overall running score. In addi-
tion, at the end of each visit, a short animation sequence
unique to each planet was presented, in order to maintain
motivation and to emphasize the difference between the
conditions. Point totals were presented on an analogue
scale consisting of a bright green vertical bar, and as a nu-
meric value. Each ‘‘visit” to a planet consisted of 36 trials,
giving 180 trials for each condition, of which 45 (25%) were
Stop trials. At the end of each complete block (‘‘delivery
Table 1
Descriptive statistics: mean inhibition rates, miss rates, SSRTs, SSDs, Go RTs,
failed Stop RTs, and Go-Stop RT differences by condition.
Measure Neutral Negative Positive
M SD M SD M SD
Inhibition rate .49 .05 .49 .04 .49 .05
Miss rate .13 .07 .12 .07 .13 .06
SSRT 219 44 223 46 222 45
SSD 229 75 237 72 237 77
Go RT 480 83 486 83 488 84
Stop (signal–respond) RT 446 74 444 72 437 66
Go RT – Stop RT 34 28 42 29 51 28
Note: Number of participants = 32. Rates are expressed as proportions and
RTs are expressed in milliseconds. The only statistically signiﬁcant dif-
ference in means (marked in bold) between conditions as tested by an
one way ANOVA omnibus F test was for the Go-Signal Respond RT dif-
ference. A follow-up planned comparison indicated that the Go-Signal
Respond difference in the neutral condition was signiﬁcantly smaller than
in the reinforced (‘‘Positive” and ‘‘Negative”) conditions.
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together with information about how many ‘‘delivery
trips” had been completed and remained.
2.3. Analysis
Mean inhibition rates were computed for each child for
each condition by dividing the number of successfully
inhibited Stop trials by the total number of Stop trials.
One-sample t tests were used to ascertain whether the
tracking algorithm had succeeded in maintaining mean
inhibition rates for each condition at 50% across the sam-
ple. As accuracy rates on the primary task were high (close
to the ceiling of 100%), the mean and standard deviation of
the percentage scores would have been poor estimates of
central tendency and dispersion, respectively. Accuracy
rates were therefore ﬁrst normalised with a p to z trans-
form, the mean and conﬁdence intervals computed, and
the statistics then converted back to percentage values
for purposes of presentation. SSRTs were computed for
each child for each condition as follows: Incorrect Go trials
were discarded, and the mean SSD for each condition was
subtracted from the correct Go RT corresponding to the
percentile representing the proportion of failed Stop trials
for that condition. Thus, for a condition in which a child
failed to inhibit on 48% of Stop trials, the mean SSD was
subtracted from the correct Go RT at the 48th percentile.
Miss rates for each condition were computed by dividing
the number of trials in which no response was recorded
before the time limit by the total number of Go trials. Mean
RTs for correct Go trials and mean RTs for Stop trials in
which a response was made were also computed. An alpha
level of .05 was used for all planned comparisons.
As the planned comparison of interest was between
neutral and reinforced conditions, differences between
the mean values of each dependent variable (SSRT; miss
rate; Go-Stop RT difference) in neutral and reinforced con-
ditions were computed, and checked for outlying values.
One-way repeated-measures ANOVAs with three levels of
motivational condition (neutral; positive and negative
reinforcement) were then conducted on SSRTs and miss
rates, and a two way repeated-measures ANOVA with the
same three levels of condition, and two levels of trial type
(Stop and Go) was conducted on the mean RTs. Planned
comparisons were made between Go-Stop RT differences
in the reinforced conditions (positive and negative) and
the neutral condition, then between the two reinforced
conditions.
2.4. Results
The children generally appeared to enjoy the experi-
ment. The mean and 95% conﬁdence limits of the accuracy
rates for the primary Go task were as follows: mean = .95;
lower cl = .86; upper cl = .98. Three children completed
only four blocks due to time constraints, and the remainder
completed all ﬁve blocks. One male participant with an
outlying Go-Stop RT difference that was 3.9 standard devi-
ations from the group mean was excluded from subse-
quent analyses, leaving 32 participants in the sample. All
other difference values were within three standard devia-tions of the group mean. Means and standard deviations
for the inhibition rates, miss rates, SSRTs, SSDs, Go RTs
and RTs on failed Stop trials (Signal–Respond) RTs are gi-
ven in Table 1.
One sample t tests indicated that the tracking algorithm
had been successful in producing inhibition rates that were
not signiﬁcantly different from 50% for any condition, the
largest variance for any condition being just over 5 per-
centage points.
2.5. Hypothesis 1
We had hypothesised that SSRTs would be shortened
when incentive to succeed was greater. One-way ANOVAs
indicated that there was no signiﬁcant difference (F < 1)
between SSRTs for each condition. The conﬁdence limits
for the mean change in SSRTs when an incentive to inhibit
was provided were 8 ms (a shortening) to +15 ms (a
lengthening). As the study had 87% power to detect a med-
ium effect (Cohen’s d > 0.5) in the hypothesised direction,
we can conclude that any shortening effect of an incentive
to succeed on the SSRT was likely to have been small.
2.6. Hypothesis 2
We had hypothesised that participants would globally
slow all responses when the incentive to succeed was
greater, resulting in an increase in miss rates, and/or a glo-
bal slowing of Go RTs. The one-way ANOVA conducted on
the miss-rates indicated no signiﬁcant difference in miss
rates (F < 1) between the three motivational conditions.
The conﬁdence limits for the mean change in miss rates
were .03 (a decrease) and .01 (an increase). Again, as the
study had 87% power to detect a medium effect in the
hypothesised direction, we can conclude that any tendency
for a greater incentive to succeed to result in an increase in
missed Go trials was unlikely, or at best a small effect.
2.7. Hypothesis 3
A two-way ANOVA (trial-type by condition) conducted
with mean correct Go RTs and mean failed Stop RTs, indi-
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F(2,32) = 7.23, p < .01, suggesting that condition had a sig-
niﬁcant effect on Go- Stop RT differences. Inspection of the
means indicated, in support of Hypothesis 3, that RT differ-
ences were greater under conditions in which the incentive
to succeed was greater (see Table 1). An expected main ef-
fect of trial type was also signiﬁcant F(1,31) = 100.19,
p < .001, indicating that mean RTs on signal–respond trials
were faster than mean RTs on hits, consistent with a horse-
race model (Logan & Cowan, 1984). There was no signiﬁ-
cant main effect of condition (F < 1). The results from this
two-way ANOVA are plotted in Fig. 8.
A planned comparison between the Go-Stop RT differ-
ences in the neutral condition with those in the two
reinforced conditions indicated that the differences were
signiﬁcantly greater in the reinforced conditions, F(1,31) =
11.92, p < .01 than in the neutral condition. The effect size
(Cohen’s d) for the differencewas 0.58, amediumeffect size.
Comparison between the differences in the two reinforced
conditions indicated that themean differenceswere greater
in the positive than the negative condition, but this differ-
ence did not reach statistical signiﬁcance, F(1,31) = 3.70,
p = .06 (See Table 1.)
3. Discussion
The ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant effect of reinforcement con-
dition on participant behaviour conﬁrms that participants
were responsive to motivational manipulation. Indeed,
children frequently expressed strong opinions about the
task, described the neutral condition as ‘‘boring”, and said
that they liked the positive condition the best. This, to-
gether with the evidence that reinforcement condition
was predictive of their Go-Stop RT differences suggests400 
425 
450 
475 
500 
Neutral Negative
R
T 
Fig. 8. Reaction times by trial type and motivational condition. As anticipated, m
This difference is increased in the reinforced trials, consistent with the hypothesithat reinforcement did inﬂuence behaviour. Nonetheless,
no signiﬁcant difference in mean SSRTs was found between
conditions, nor was there any trend to signiﬁcance. Our
ﬁndings therefore do not support Hypothesis 1, namely
that given increased incentive to inhibit, participants
would shorten their SSRTs. However, it should be pointed
out that our modelling exercise indicated that a more neg-
ative skew in the Go RT distribution results in a greater
overestimate of the SSRT. Given the evidence in our study
of an increased skew in Go RT distribution, as indexed by
the observed increase in Go-Stop RT difference, it is possi-
ble that a real decrease in SSRT in response to increased
motivation might have been masked by this effect.
Our ﬁnding that there was no signiﬁcant increase in
miss rates or mean RTs in the reinforced conditions, nor
any trend in that direction, fails to support Hypothesis 2,
namely that participants would tend to slow their Go re-
sponses globally when a greater incentive was provided
for successfully inhibited Stop trials, regardless of the cost
in missed Go trials. However, it may well be the case that
such a strategy might be adopted under conditions in
which the time limit for Go responses was less tight, or
when the incentive to inhibit was increased simply by
modiﬁcation of the task instruction, as in the Band et al.
study (2003), in which participants were either asked to
respond as fast as possible, or to balance speed with accu-
racy, but in which no set time-limit was imposed.
The ﬁnding that the Go-Stop differences differed by
motivational condition, and tended to be greater where
the incentive to inhibit was greater, indicates support for
Hypothesis 3: that participants would calibrate the degree
of inhibition applied to the Go process in such a way as to
optimize their overall probability of success on both trial
types, and thus timing their responses to fall within thePositive
Go 
Stop 
ean RTs (in milliseconds) for failed Stop trials are shorter than for Go trials.
s that responses are targeted in a time-window that will optimize success.
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icant effect of condition on the skewness statistic, this ef-
fect alone would not differentiate between Hypothesis 2
and Hypothesis 3. However the lack of any indication of in-
creased miss rate, or any signiﬁcant increase in mean Go
RT, as would be predicted under Hypothesis 2 means that
the observed increase in Go-Stop RT difference can be re-
garded as support for Hypothesis 3. Thus, the behaviour
of children under different motivational conditions was
emulated by that of our simulated reinforcement learning
model.
As expected, the children’s hit rate stabilized at a high
level, and there was no signiﬁcant main effect of motiva-
tional condition on overall Go RTs. This suggests that the
children placed an intrinsic value on speedy responses,
whether or not Go trials were extrinsically rewarded. This
interpretation was supported by a subsequent trial-by-trial
analysis of the children’s behavioural data, indicating that
where there were two consecutive Go trials, the RT on
the second trial tended to be shorter, t(31) = 6.42,
p < .001, a ﬁnding also reported by Emeric et al. (2007). This
is also indicated by the fact that the signiﬁcantly greater
Go-Stop RT difference where there was greater incentive
to inhibit was reﬂected in an only slight increase in mean
Go RTs that was coupled with an actual drop in failed Stop
RTs. This suggests that, as with the model, the value placed
on maintaining a high hit rate prevented a global shift of
the distribution rightwards, and therefore resulted in a
lower mean value in the lower half of the distribution, from
which failed Stop RTs would have been drawn.
It is probably worth noting that our third hypothesis
predicts not only a greater difference between Go and
failed Stop RTs under the more motivated conditions, but
also a more negative skew to the distribution of Go RTs.
However, because the sampling error of the skew statistic
is high, a very large number of trials would be required to
deliver the statistical power required to detect anything
less than a very large between-condition effect. In our
modelling exercise the effect size of condition on the skew-
ness statistic was less than a quarter of the size of the ef-
fect on the Go-Stop RT difference; we can conclude,
therefore, that our study lacked the power to detect an ef-
fect of condition on the skewness statistic of the Go RT dis-
tribution. Indeed, in our sample, the F ratio for the
between-condition effect on skew was well below 1 for
all participants.
3.1. General discussion
The high level of motivation reﬂected in the children’s
comments and in their performance makes the failure to
ﬁnd any evidence in the empirical data for motivational
modulation of SSRTs noteworthy, and suggests that at least
in typically developing children, SSRT may be a simple
function of processing speed and ballistic processes, and
irreducible beyond a certain level, despite incentives to
do so. What did appear to be under volitional control
was inhibitory modulation of the Go process. This is con-
sistent with the ﬁndings of Band et al. (2003) that in a cued
Go/No-Go task, participants who were asked to try to bal-
ance speed with accuracy tended to respond more slowlyon all trials than those who were simply asked to prioritize
speed, and suggests that top-down ‘‘restraint” processes
may have inhibited the preparation of the Go response
on all trials. Of note, the role of restraint processes across
two types of action control tasks, the Go/No-Go task by
Band et al. (2003) and the Stop Signal Task employed here,
is consistent with the suggestion that these tasks tap com-
mon cognitive processes that support the control of action
more in general (Aron et al., 2007).
In our task, unlike that of Band et al. (2003), slow re-
sponses were penalized in the reinforced conditions, mak-
ing global slowing of go responses a penalized option. It
was therefore of interest to see whether participants
would be able to learn, not merely to delay their responses,
but to calibrate their timing in order to maximize the over-
all chance of success, including timely responses on Go tri-
als as well as successfully inhibited Stop trials (although of
course the tracking algorithm ensured that this remained
close to 50%). Our ﬁndings suggest that they were indeed
able to do so, and raise the possibility that inhibitory pro-
cesses do not simply race against activation process, but
can be coordinated synergistically in order to target an
optimal response time window, delaying the response un-
til close to the ‘‘deadline”, as proposed by Ollman (1973).
In turn, the evolution of this ﬁne-tuned balance when
highly motivated is consistent with models suggesting
more broadly that the timely valuation of gains and losses
plays a key role in learning to control action (Montague
et al., 2006; Schultz et al., 1997).
In the context of Stop Signal Task performance speciﬁ-
cally, and with regards to theories of action control more
generally, one way of reconciling the evidence that the
‘‘horse race” between go and stopping processes are inde-
pendent with evidence that inhibitory processes interact
with the go processes might therefore be to extend the
‘‘interactive horse race” model of Boucher et al. (2007) to
include an interaction between a proactive pre-stimulus
restraint process and the go preparation response process.
Boucher et al. (2007) suggest that activation in neurons
responsible for inhibiting activation in go response prepa-
ration neurons rises rapidly following completion of the
encoding of the Stop signal, and results, almost immedi-
ately, in the cancellation of the go response. This may be
considered as a phasic reactive rise in activation of the
inhibitory circuits consequent on presentation of the Stop
signal. A schematic of their model is shown in the upper
plot in Fig. 9. However, if we posit that go activation may
also interact with pre-stimulus proactive activation levels
in inhibitory circuits in the same manner, we ﬁnd that
the interaction has minimal impact on the measured SSRT,
but has a major impact on the Go reaction time, as shown
in the lower plot in Fig. 9. As well as providing a good ﬁt to
the behavioural data and computational model presented
here, the effect of this additional parameter representing
proactive inhibition to the model proposed by Boucher
et al. (2007) is entirely consistent with the observed mod-
ulation of pre-stimulus event-related components such as
the Lateralized Readiness Potential and the Contingent
Negative Variation when participants are motivated to in-
hibit responses accurately, as reported by Band et al.
(2003).
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Fig. 9. Proactive and reactive (phasic) inhibition. Note: The upper plot illustrates the model proposed by Boucher et al. (2007): in response to a Go stimulus,
after a period of encoding, activation in neurons involved in preparation of the go response rise rapidly. The onset of the Stop signal is also followed by an
encoding period, at the end of which activation rises rapidly in neurons that inhibit the rising go activation, rapidly arresting the rise. If the rise is arrested
before an execution threshold is reached, the go response is successfully inhibited. The circles represent a Go trial, and the triangles a Stop trial in which the
SSD is at a value that only just allows time for a successful inhibition. The shaded portion of the plot represents the time interval between the start of the
rise in stopping process activation, and arrest of the rise in go process activation. The Go RT line represents the RT that would have occurred had the trial
been a Go trial. The lower Figure illustrates our proposed model, in which proactive (baseline) pre-stimulus levels of activation in inhibitory circuits may be
greater than zero, and also interact with the rising activation in the Go circuit, lengthening the RT should a response be made. Note that change in proactive
level of activation in the inhibition circuits does not affect the observed SSRT.
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and proactively modulate the speed of the go process, pos-
sibly by active control of the level of pre-stimulus inhibi-
tion, and thus bringing the duration of their response-
delay under volitional control. In our model runs, a slower
‘‘delay” was more likely to be selected for each trial when
the ‘‘incentive” to inhibit was greater, resulting in both
longer RTs for both failed Stop and Go trials. However,
greater ‘‘incentive” to inhibit also resulted in a less posi-
tively (or more negatively) skewed distribution, increasing
the difference between mean Go and mean failed Stop RTs.
Our empirical data also showed this increase in RT differ-
ence, but superimposed on an overall trend for children
to reduce their response time. Thus, while the participants
increased their mean Go RT slightly when the motivation
to succeed was greater as well, their mean failed Stop
RTs, actually showed a decrease.We propose that while the efﬁciency of the process by
which a Stop signal is encoded may be subject to individual
variation, resulting in between-subjects variability in ob-
served SSRTs, the efﬁciency of the process is resistant to
volitional control. Our ﬁndings suggest that the efﬁciency
of the phasic, reactive, response to a countermanding stim-
ulus has a ceiling that is readily achieved in typically devel-
oping children, and suggests that the horse-race model
proposed by Logan and Cowan (1984) accounts largely
for stimulus-driven aspects of inhibitory control.
Evidence that the phasic, reactive, response to a counter-
manding signal, as measured by the SSRT, tends to be of
greater duration in disorders such as ADHD (Jennings
et al., 1997; Logan et al., 1997; Nigg, 1999; Schachar et al.,
1993) may therefore indicate slower speed-of-processing
or inattention in such disorders, but does not in itself pro-
vide an explanation of impaired control of behaviour, such
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clearly a child with longer reaction times or greater difﬁ-
culty in attending to warning signals will requiremore time
to comply with a countermanding instruction.
We note the fact that the RT difference between neutral
and reinforced blocks was observed in data in which each
motivational condition was presented in each of ﬁve
blocks. This suggests that the effect was not dwarfed by
practice effects, which in turn suggests that, while the chil-
dren rapidly learned an effective strategy that they were
willing to employ when motivated to succeed, the strategy
remained effortful, and was therefore relaxed when the
incentive to inhibit was lessened. One interpretation of this
ﬁnding is that while these typically developing children
were easily able to summon sufﬁcient attentional re-
sources to reach a plateau of efﬁciency with regard to their
encoding of the stop stimulus, the capacity to restrain their
impulse to respond was considerably more stretched.
The model and ﬁndings presented thus raise potentially
interesting questions as to what processes might be deﬁ-
cient in conditions such as such as ADHD that are marked
by apparently impulsive behaviour on tasks such as the
Stop Signal Task. If the interactive model of Boucher et al.
(2007) is correct, the consistent ﬁndings of lengthened
SSRTs in children with ADHD (Jennings et al., 1997; Logan
et al., 1997; Nigg, 1999; Schachar et al., 1993) would tend
to implicate slow encoding and/or failure to initiate the
stopping process on some trials (Band et al., 2003). How-
ever, consistent with the hypothesis made by Schachar
et al. (2007), our model and ﬁndings suggest that proactive
restraint processes may be more relevant to the clinical
symptoms of impulsivity than slow encoding processes,
and that the ability to delay the go response strategically
may itself merit further investigation in children with
ADHD. However, our model suggests that restraint is more
likely to be indexed by the degree of RT slowing than by
change in SSRTs.
Furthermore, as our ﬁndings suggest that typically
developing children are not only able to delay their re-
sponses but to optimize their timing, it would be of inter-
est to knowwhether this ability is reduced in children with
ADHD. Impaired time production has been reported in chil-
dren with ADHD (Bauermeister et al., 2005), giving reason
to expect that children with ADHD might also show a re-
duced ability to learn to ﬁnd the ‘‘sweet spot” required
for optimal performance on tasks such as the Stop Signal
Task. Smith and Brewer (1995) found that older adults
were less able than young adults to target their responses
within the ‘‘fast, safe” RT band, their RT adjustment being
coarser than that of the younger group, and their RT vari-
ance thus greater. One possibility is that children and ado-
lescents with ADHD may also struggle with ﬁne RT
adjustment, as would be supported by the robust ﬁnding
of greater RT variability in Stop Signal Task data in these
groups than in their age peers (Lijfﬁjt et al., 2005). Further
studies in which the learning model presented in this pa-
per is lesioned in various ways in order to produce patterns
of ‘‘behaviour” that might distinguish between causal def-
icits may shed light on these questions. Such attempts
could also elucidate controversies on the effects of motiva-
tional incentives on Stop Signal Task performance in chil-dren with ADHD (Huang-Pollock et al., 2007; Konrad
et al., 2000; Michel et al., 2005; Oosterlaan & Sergeant,
1998; Scheres et al., 2001; Slusarek et al., 2001). In conclu-
sion, our current effort builds upon existing computational
models as well as multiple behavioural and electrophysio-
logical ﬁndings, but critically extends them by operational-
ising the parameters through which motivation modulates
the control of action when the value assigned to the con-
ﬂicting goals of speed and restraint are ﬁnely balanced.
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